I study the e¤ect of political uncertainty on the credit risk premium (or distress risk ) and on the default risk (or jump-to-default risk ) embedded in the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads over the Euro zone. After calibrating the Pan and Singleton (2008) pricing model for sovereign Credit Default Swap spreads used to obtain a spread decomposition into two components, I …nd that the credit risk premium accounts, on average, for the 42 percent of the observed spreads in the European credit market. Therefore, relying on a Vector Autoregressive approach, I show how political uncertainty has a signi…cant lead-lag relation with both credit measures, where a 10 percent increase in the degree of political uncertainty leads to a signi…cant increase in the two components of the credit risk of about 3 percent after a month. Additionally, individual countries react di¤erently to variations in the degree of political uncertainty, highlighting a sort of heterogeneity in the European credit market. Hence, this work enriches the understanding about the macroeconomic forces that have driven variations in sovereign risk over the Euro zone and introduce political uncertainty as a signi…cant factor driving the European credit market.
Does political uncertainty in the Euro zone matter for investors around the world? In other words, how is the problem-solving ability of the European leading economies perceived by …nancial investors? Does political uncertainty a¤ect symmetrically all the European countries, or could one con…gure a regional or a geographic e¤ect?
Speci…c events can lead to dramatic changes in the willingness to bear sovereign credit risk, a¤ecting adversely the …nancial markets. These changes are mostly re ‡ected in credit spread variations, which have their own roots in the perceived default risk of that speci…c country, whose policy depends crucially on political decisions of the European Union. I analyze this issue through the lens of the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market which allows for understanding the implied default risk of a country.
During a period of …nancial turmoil, making coherent political decisions in a short time is crucial for avoiding crisis worsening. The issue becomes more serious when the core of the discussion is a country's bailout. Greece was rescued on May 2010 after a long period of hesitation which took about four months.
In fact, as reported by the New York Times in an article of February 15, 2010, "...opposition grew among Germans to bailing out what they call spendthrifts to the south after years of belt-tightening by workers at home". During those four months, investors were worried about the uncertainty concerning the …rst bail-out in the European Union history, such that the cumulative return, from the beginning of 2010 to the day before making the decision (May 10, 2010), accounted for a -26.89% for the Athens Stock Exchange index (ASE) and 67.22% for the 10-year Greek sovereign bond yield. Similar variations, just slightly di¤erent in magnitudes, were experienced also by other peripheral countries such as Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
The Greek situation may be seen as a signal that the EU political environment is still far from being stable. The rapid expansion of the CDS market over the period 2008 to 2012 may be seen as a signal of the increasing risk aversion in the credit market.
This study is related to the literature that explains empirically sovereign CDS spreads variations through a macroeconomic perspective.
It is closely related to the work of Pan and Singleton (2008) , Longsta¤ et al. (2011) and . The former builds a sovereign CDS pricing model which allows for the spread decomposition into a market price of risk and a default risk. They …nd that the market price of risk of some emerging markets, such as Turkey, Mexico and Korea, is statistically correlated with some measures of …nancial market volatility (VIX), global event risk (US credit spread) and macroeconomic policy (currency-implied volatility). Longsta¤ et al. (2011) calibrate the same pricing model over a wider set of emerging markets and then regress the CDS spread components on local and global market variables, on di¤erent measures of risk premiums, such as equity, volatility and term premia and on global capital ‡ows. They …nd that CDS-implied risk premia are more related to global economic measures than to local variables. Ang and Longsta¤ (2011) 18 European developed economies. They argue that the size and the pre-crisis health of both the world and country's …nancial market positively a¤ect the CDS spread. Moreover, they stress the potential role of the private-to-public risk transfer channel -that is, more government guarantees on the …nancial sectors, signi…cant extension of loans' amount to the banking system, etc. -which allows investors to form expectations about future …nancial bailouts. Related to this work is Acharya et al. (2011) which …rst models and then tests the two-way feedback e¤ect between the sovereign credit risk and …nancial markets. When a sovereign comes into play to rescue its insolvent …nancial system with a debt expansion …nanced by taxes, it induces a positive signal in the market which then turns into a negative one owing to an increase in the marginal cost of raising the tax revenue (La¤er curve) and a more limited maximum debt capacity. Hence, a distressed sovereign may exacerbate the …nancial sector's solvency condition since it would no longer be able to make any transfer. Another interesting study has been conducted by Brutti and Sauré (2012) who assess the contribution of …nancial linkages to the transmission of sovereign default risk.
Thanks to a particular econometric tool, they are able to identify …nancial shocks that originated in Greece and spread overall European countries. They …nd that "a 10 percent increase in the exposure to Greek debt increases the rate of cross-country transmission of sovereign risk by 3.94 percent".
Alongside empirical studies on the macro-determinants of credit spread, theoretical and empirical works on the role of political decisions in both stock and capital markets have recently been developed. Pastor and Veronesi (2011a), Pastor and Veronesi (2011b) and Ulrich (2011) , among others. The former theoretically investigates the e¤ect of the government's policy decision on the stock prices in a Bayesian-learning equilibrium framework. Their main result is that, on average, the stock price drops down, with this reduction being larger when the announcement of a political change includes elements of surprise. Pastor and Veronesi (2011b)'s model allows for the equity risk premium's decomposition into three components related to three di¤erent shocks. While the …rst two are deemed as economic shocks, the third one is the political shock which "a¤ect investors'beliefs about which policy the government might adopt in the future". Moreover, using the Baker My work introduces a novelty in the literature. To my best knowledge, it is the …rst in investigating the linkage between implied-CDS risk premium and political uncertainty. While the former requires a theoretical framework to be extracted from asset prices, it is challenging to measure the degree of political uncertainty over time. As a result, Baker et al. (2011) have created a monthly index able to proxy for policy-related uncertainty over time.
The analysis is conducted on a sample of 19 European countries, inside and outside the EU and EMU.
For each country, I calibrate the Pan and Singleton (2008) pricing model for sovereign CDS to decompose the spread into the two components: the credit risk premium and the default risk. The former measures the compensation investors demand for bearing the credit risk of that country due to unexpected variations in the default intensity, namely, the probability of default, whereas the default risk is a residual measure that is a proxy for the (negative) jump in the value of the contingent claim upon default. Several results emerge from this analysis.
First, I …nd that the sovereign CDS market embodies credit risk features that allow countries to live in di¤erent clusters. In fact, the Cluster Analysis shows a certain geography of the credit risk, where the biggest group is comprised of the most e¢ cient economies or core economies, such as Austria, Finland, France, Fourth, panel regressions of the variations in the credit risk premia show how a 10%-increase in political uncertainty, after controlling for information already included in both the European and the US …nancial markets, leads to a signi…cant increase in the credit risk premia of about 3.2 percent after a month. Such an increase is slightly smaller in the case of the default risk, that is, 2.9 per cent but still signi…cant. Moreover, 1 Belgium is included among the unstable countries since it has gone through a period of political instability from 2007 to 2011. A point which will be clearer later on.
relying on a panel vector autoregressive (VAR) approach, I con…rm the signi…cant lead-lag relation of political uncertainty with both the credit risk premia and the default risk. On an aggregate level, a shock to the credit market that increases the default risk decreases the degree of political uncertainty after three months the shock is generate. Such a result may signal the corrective or disciplinary role of the market in putting pressure on policymakers to act so as to reduce political uncertainty in the presence of a serious risk of default rather than "mere" variations in the risk aversion. Additionally, employing the VAR approach on a country level, I explore the heterogeneity of the European countries'credit market in responding to variations in the degree of political uncertainty and how the latter is in ‡uenced by the credit conditions of speci…c countries such as the core and peripheral economies. Lastly, aggregating both the credit risk premia and the default risk measures across the three macro regions, an interesting scenario emerges: a political shock has a signi…cant impact on the risk premia of the peripheral economies after a month the shock is generated and on the default risk of the core economies after three months, whereas a shock to the premia of the core economies leads to an signi…cant increase in the degree of political uncertainty after two months. Moreover, the corrective role of the market is con…rmed also on a regional level.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 introduces description of the data, together with the cluster analysis and the principal component analysis. The Pan and Singleton (2008) sovereign CDS pricing model is shown in Section 2 as well as the way the credit risk premium and default risk measures are extracted. Then, in Section 3, I calibrate the model, and, in Section 4, I stress and discuss the role of political uncertainty in the credit market. Section 5 concludes the analysis.
The Data
Two types of data are used for the analysis: Credit Default Swap spreads and the European policy-related uncertainty index.
A CDS is a …nancial derivative contract agreed between two parties: the buyer and the seller. The former commits himself to a periodic payment, usually quarterly or semiannual, to the seller and is compensated on the arrival of a speci…c credit event related to an underlying debt obligation such as a bond or a loan. While for a company a credit event may be the bankruptcy or default, for a country it is not correct to talk about a pure default. The most appropriate de…nition for sovereign credit event is provided by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), which references four types of credit events: acceleration, failure to pay, restructuring and repudiation. As pointed out by Pan and Singleton (2008) , these events cannot happen simultaneously, and, therefore, the contract may be executed as soon as one of them occurs 2 .
CDS spreads are collected from the Markit database and cover a period of 1336 days from December 3,
2007 to January 22, 2013 for the maturities 1, 3, 5, and 7 and for 19 European countries, inside and outside the European Union and the Economic and Monetary Union. Therefore, the total dataset consists of 101,536
daily spreads. The sample period is dictated by the data availability. Indeed, trading on CDS spreads of the wealthiest countries, such as Norway, Sweden and Germany, is not available before our starting date since the biggest worries about the debt situation have been in the game after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, which involved sharp increases in the spreads.
The European policy-related economic uncertainty index, provided by Baker et al. (2011) , is a weighted sum of two components: newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty and disagreement among professional economic forecasters. The former is obtained by counting the number of articles including policy relevant terms, such as "policy," "tax," "de…cit" and so on, and then detrended in order to take into account the increasing number of news over years. Disagreement among forecasters is used as a proxy for uncertainty, as has already been explored by authors such as Boero et al. (2008) , Bomberger (1996) and Lahiri and Sheng I consider Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, as member of both the EU and the EMU, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden and UK as part only of the EU, and, …nally, Norway as an extra-EU and-EMU state, deemed the safest country in all of Europe. In order to have a picture of European countries'performances over the concerning 2 The literature has been focusing on CDS spreads instead of bond spread because they are not a¤ected by both ‡ight-toquality e¤ect and contractual arrangements, such as seniority, coupon rates, guarantees and embedded options. 3 Index source: www.policyuncertainty.com for additional details.
period, Figure 1 depicts the average of the changes of the unemployment rate and the mean real GDP growth rate over the period December 2007 to January 2013 for each country. investors are willing to pay just 21 bps to protect themselves against a remote Norwegian default. Again, the largest standard deviation is that of Greece, followed by Ireland and Portugal. The whole picture that emerges from this summary indicates that there is a consistent time variation in CDS spreads. The last row reports descriptive statistics for the policy-related uncertainty index.
The Geography of Credit Risk
Given the large number of countries used for the analysis, it may be worthwhile to check if they share some particular features such that they can live in clusters. Indeed, as shown by Figure 1 , some economies share common features, such as the peripheral ones (Italy, Portugal, Spain Ireland and Greece) and the Eastern countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania).
I perform a multivariate cluster analysis according to the complete method. Such a method is applied in the hierarchical cluster analysis whose purpose is to optimize an objective function which is usually a distance between a pair of clusters. Starting with each variable being a cluster, a cluster is formed at each new step such that the variation of the within-group variance, or the distance between cluster centers, is as small as possible, while the between-group variance is as large as possible. The algorithm uses the largest distance between objects in the two clusters. In this case, the distance is Euclidean and measures the similarity by computing the square root of the sum of the squared di¤erences in the variables'values.
The cluster analysis is known to be performed according to several methods (or algorithms) and distances.
Therefore, the choice is rationally dictated by the cophenetic correlation which measures the faithfulness of the pairwise distance between the original variables'values. In other words, the higher this correlation, the better the solution's quality.
First of all, I use the correlation matrix of daily changes of CDS spreads as a measure of similarity among objects. Then, I apply the method through an algorithm that attempts to form clusters at each step as indicated above. Moreover, such a method requires knowing the number of clusters a priori ; therefore, I use a rule of thumb and select N=4 groups, where N is the number of variables. note that the extra-EU country, Norway, always maintains a great distance from the rest of Europe. Greece comes out of the cluster of the peripherals due mostly to its orderly default, that is, the agreement reached by the majority of private sovereign bondholders on March 9th, 2012 which led to the suspension of trading on Greek CDS contracts. In addition to this, Table 2 reports also the cophenetic correlation which ensures the goodness of the …t.
Principal Component Analysis
The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) will help measuring the degree of heterogeneity in the European credit market. The PCA is performed on the correlation matrix of monthly log-changes of 5-year CDS spreads. Starting from daily observations, I pick up the mid most available spread of the month ending up with a monthly time series of 61 observations. The mid observation is chosen such that the sample is not a¤ected by stale observation. Moreover, the log-transformation allows for scaling the very large Greek spreads.
The emerging correlation structure, not reported here, shows that almost 26 percent of the pairwise correlations is greater than 80 percent. This is common especially among the core economies, e.g., France
and Germany, which have a correlation of 86 percent. Moreover, Greece and Portugal present the lowest average correlations of 12 percent and 0.8 percent, respectively.
Bearing this comovements' picture in mind, Table 3 It may be worth notice that the …rst PC of the cluster of the Peripheral economies is only 3.8 per cent bigger than that of the whole set of countries. Such a small di¤erence may be associated with the negative correlation between Ireland and Portugal over the last part of the sample, when on July 21, 2011 a draft statement drawn down by EU countries was approved, allowing the Irish government to pay a smaller interest rate on its bailout on a longer maturity 4 . This involved a trend inversion for Irish CDS spread.
Panel C of Table 3 The whole picture that emerges from this statistical analysis is that CDS spread variations embed credit risk features that can be clustered over speci…c European regions and that there is a certain correlation structure with political uncertainty and other European and US …nancial variables which lay the basis for a deeper understanding. In fact, the next goal is to test the e¤ect of political uncertainty on what moves the European credit market, namely, the credit risk premium and the default risk, after controlling for information already embedded in the …nancial markets.
Credit Risk Premium and Default Risk
This section is preliminary for the empirical analysis since here I …rst present and then calibrate the Pan and
Singleton (2008) pricing model for sovereign CDS to extract the main variables for the empirical analysis, namely, the credit risk premium and the default risk. Once again, the credit risk premium is the premium an investor asks to bear the risk of that asset due to unexpected variation in the default intensity, whereas the default risk is the negative jump upon default in the value of the contingent claim.
The Pricing Model
Even if a CDS contract written on a company's bond di¤er from that written on a sovereign bond in its own credit event de…nition, the theoretical pricing framework is still valid. Here I report a brief description of the Pan and Singleton (2008) reduced-form model for sovereign CDS spreads.
A CDS contract with maturity M consists of two components, the buyer's premium, de…ned as CDS t (M ) and paid quarterly or semiannually, and the amount the buyer gets from the seller upon a credit event occurs.
Assuming a semiannual payment and a notional equal to one, the premium leg, that is, the present value of the premium ‡ows, is as follows
where the term in brackets catches the risk-neutral survival-dependent nature of the payments, that is, they are discounted according to a risk-free interest rate, r t , plus a default intensity,
Instead, the present 5 In reduced-form models, a default is modeled as the …rst arrival of a risk-neutral Poisson process whose stochastic intensity process is represented by Q t . For more details, see Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002) .
value of the amount the seller will pay upon a credit event is
where L Q = 1 R Q is the loss given default, expressed as the face value minus the recovery rate, R Q .
As a plain IRSs, a CDS contract is written by both the buyer and the seller if it is worth zero at inception.
This allows us to infer the contract-implicit spreads as follows:
According to the way one interprets the fractional recovery, the pricing model can be di¤erent. Following 
where D (t; u) represents the price of a default-free zero coupon bond issued at time t and maturing at time u, while the expectation term is nothing more than the risk-neutral death probability.
The Stochastic Default Intensity Process
The Pan and Singleton (2008) model is challenging for its assumption about the intensity process.
They assume that the arrival rate of a credit event, The stochastic process, under the objective probabilities, has the following representation
where k P is the mean reversion speed, P the long-term mean level and Q t the local volatility for local
Assuming an a¢ ne market price of risk t ,
the Girsanov theorem shows that under an equivalent change of measure, the stochastic process under the risk-neutral probability becomes
preserving the same characteristics as under the objective measure.
In order not to be confused about the notation, here I am considering the risk-neutral default intensity, Q t , under both probability measures. The reason why I deal with such a probabilistic framework is readily shown by Yu, Fan (2002) who, analyzing such reduced-form pricing models, points out how they can only be applicable prior to default, since they su¤er a survival bias, which is related to the process under the objective measure 6 . Therefore, the Pan and Singleton (2008) model is able to extract only the default risk premium (or credit risk premium or distress risk ), which is the compensation investors demand for bearing the risk due to unexpected variations in the default intensity. It does not catch the default event risk premium (or default risk or jump-to-default), that is, the (negative) jump in the value of the contingent claim at default.
As highlighted by Longsta¤ et al. (2011) , the latter is typically measured as the ratio between the risk-neutral and the objective intensity,
However, the objective intensity is hard to infer from prices alone because, being a rare event, it requires deeper understanding of the …nancial situation of a sovereign. Thus, from market prices one is able to infer only the risk-neutral intensity under the objective probabilities.
Such a lognormal process has its own advantages. Indeed, as we know, a lognormal distribution has fatter tails than the classical noncentral chi-squared distribution of the usually-used CIR process. Even if it preserves the mean reverting feature, is strictly positive and has a distribution skewed to the right, it may su¤er the explosion problem. But the main shortcoming is that the outcoming survival probabilities are not available in closed-form.
Given the intensity dynamics as described by the SDE in equation 5, the risk-neutral survival probability
is measured by approximating numerically its corresponding PDE with a fully implicit …nite di¤erence method 7 .
Credit Risk Premium and Default Risk
This model can only infer the distress risk from CDS spreads. Such a risk may be priced in the market to the extent that the implied risk-neutral probabilities di¤er from the objective ones, which catch investors' expectations in the sovereign CDS market. the objective probabilities, also known as the pseudo CDS spread, this is,
where the expectations are taken under the natural probabilities.
Accordingly, the market price of distress risk premium or credit risk premium, CRP t (M ), is measured simply by the di¤erence between the CDS spread under Q in equation 1 and the pseudo one in equation 4, 7 A numerical approximation, like …nite di¤erence methods, may lose stability at boundaries when the underlying process turns out to be pure convection (drift equal to zero) or pure di¤usion (volatility equal to zero). In order to avoid this, I apply the exponential …tted scheme which has good convergence properties and does not allow for spurious oscillations. For more details, see Du¤y (2001) that is,
What here I call default risk is nothing more than the residual from the distress risk. In other words, following the interpretation of the expected return given by Yu (2002) , the risk premium deriving from the di¤erence between a defaultable and a default-free bond, consists of the sum of two parties: the …rst is related to variations in the spread, namely, in the unpredictable intensity (distress risk ) and the second is related to the default event (jump-to-default risk ). Estimating the default event risk premium requires not only market prices but also …nancial statement data, thus, following Longsta¤ et al. (2011), I quantify it as the di¤erence between the CDS and its implicit CRP.
Estimation Strategy
The model is calibrated according to the quasi-maximum likelihood (Q-MLE) method, using the termstructure of CDS spreads for the maturities 1-, 3-, 5-and 7-year. The approach is widely used in the term structure literature and is referred to the dated works of Longsta¤ and Schwarts (1992) and Chen and Scott The underlying assumption is to assume that a CDS contract over a speci…c maturity is priced without error. In such a way, one can invert the model and get the latent variable, that is, the unobservable default intensity. This is possible thanks to the availability of a term structure of CDS spreads. A widely used empirical trick is to choose the most liquid maturity and thus, I choose the 5-year CDS spread whose trading volume has always been higher than other maturities 8 .
The parameters are estimated with respect to the distribution of the implied-CDS default intensity. The intensity, given by the SDE in equation 2 under the objective probabilities, has a lognormal density with mean, m t , and variance, v:
Letting CDS t (M ) be the vector of CDS spreads 9 for maturities M = 1; 3; 7, I assume that the pricing error is normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance. Therefore, the model CDS t (M ) = h Q t + t , where h ( ) is the pricing function (equation 1) and t the pricing error, is jointly estimated according to the following joint density
where the …rst term on the RHS comes from the Markov assumption of the stochastic process and
Finally, the parameter set consists of 8 parameters, that is,
The daily risk-free discount functions are bootstrapped from constant maturity bonds collected from the H.15 release of the Federal Reserve system. Several methods can be used for getting discount functions from market data, but their e¤ect in pricing CDS contract is negligible, since it enters the pricing function symmetrically. Moreover, as shown by Du¢ e (2003), under some speci…c conditions, a CDS contract can be replicated by an arbitrage-free portfolio by buying a default-free ‡oater and shorting a defaultable ‡oater. As we know, the sensitivity of these securities to interest rate variations is very small, endorsing the assumption about the method used to extract the discount function. Table 4 reports the estimated parameters with standard errors in parentheses and average log-likelihoods 10 .
Parameters'Calibration
As we can observe from the standard deviations, the model …ts the term structure well enough with some exceptions for the 1-year CDS contract. This is a model's feature already observed in Pan and Singleton (2008) where the shorter maturities seem to be priced with greater errors. Moreover, the calibration con…rms other empirical characteristics: the credit environment is worse under the risk neutral probabilities than under the objective ones, k Q Q > k P P , allowing for larger and more persistent (k Q > k P ) default intensities under Q than under P for the majority of countries. Finally, k P > 0 for each country, meaning that the process Q t is P-stationary.
The Calibrated Credit Risk Components
Di¤erences in the calibrated parameters across probabilistic environments allow for inferring that a credit risk premium is priced in the CDS market.
The credit risk premium for the 5-year CDS spread is computed as in equation 5. Table 5 reports summary statistics for both the credit risk premia (CRP ) and the default risk (DRP ).It is worth notice that the mean value goes from a minimum of 0.3 bps for UK to a maximum of 303.3 bps for Greece, whereas the default risk ranges from a minimum of 8 bps of Norway to a maximum of 1142 bps of Greece. The default risk is on average greater in magnitude than CRPs. This bigger magnitude is due to the way the default risk measure is built. On one hand, being a residual measure, one may conclude that it can contain everything (more than the default risk itself) except the credit risk premium. But, on the other hand, the theoretical issue explained above asserts that it may be indeed deemed as a reliable measure of the jump-to-default risk, which is not directly captured by reduced form models. In addition to this, the credit risk premium, on average, accounts for what is concerned with the growth rate or in ‡ation rate, but also for the perceived credit risk, allowing for asymmetric e¤ects stirred up by a common shock that makes ine¢ cient a common policy intervention.
Moreover, as outlined by the PCA results, the Eastern countries have su¤ered the most shocks from the …nancial crisis since these are economies with non-well developed banking systems that are forced to rely on foreign borrowing, thus, exposed to spillover e¤ect.
Political Uncertainty and Credit Risk
Does political uncertainty a¤ect the risk perceptions of investors in the European credit market? In other words, do investors require a higher risk premium in the presence of a higher degree of political uncertainty?
Is the default risk a¤ected by such an uncertainty?
I answer these questions by employing a set of panel regressions where I regress separately the two components embedded in the credit market on the policy-uncertainty index adding step-by-step …nancial control variables. The latter have the following purposes: …rstly, they make the analysis more robust in case I can con…gure a signi…cant relation between political uncertainty and credit market; secondly, they can dampen the main criticism on the policy-related uncertainty index, that is, the way it is built allows for catching also economic and …nancial uncertainty rather than only political uncertainty. In fact, including stock, credit and commodity markets in the analysis enables me to purify the political index from …nancial and economic information, leaving out only the political part. This is possible because the above mentioned markets are known to be very liquid, thus, they incorporate market information in a very fast way.
To this end, I include control variables such as the domestic stock market index as a proxy for the state of local economies 11 , the Eurostoxx50 and S&P500 implied volatilities (V2X and VIX ) to proxy respectively for the European and US stock market uncertainty, the iTraxx Euro CDX and the IG US CDX to proxy for the creditworthiness of the European and US industrial sector, respectively, the price-earning ratio of the Dax and Eurostoxx50 Indices to proxy for the investors'expectation on the growth in Europe, the TED spread for catching liquidity issues and the gold price that is deemed the safe-heaven asset during distress periods. Such variables are chosen to the extent that I can control for Europe-speci…c variables and spillover relations from the US market.
The Empirical Methodology: Panel Regressions
The analysis is performed on the log-di¤erences in order to i) scale the variables such that the exponential increase in the Greek spread does not absorb all the variance, ii) measure the percentage e¤ect or relationship of the variables on the credit market. Moreover, to make the analysis more robust, I perform the panel regressions clustering the errors across time. In such a way, I will be able to catch possible time-varying dependences since it may be the case that during distress periods the correlation between markets increases dramatically making the estimation less reliable. The econometric model is the following:
ln Y i;t = 1 ln P olIdx t + 2 ln P olIdx t 1 + X i;t + i + u i;t (6) where Y is either the credit risk premium or the default risk, P olIdx is the policy-related uncertainty index, X i;t is the set of control variables and i captures country …xed e¤ect. Tables 6 and 7 Table 6 and 7 draw a clear and signi…cant in ‡uence of political uncertainty in the European credit market, where the e¤ect is stronger in magnitude on the credit risk premium that on the default risk. Interestingly, the set of variables is able to explain the 6 percent of the variation more in the default risk than those in the credit risk premium (R 2 of 46.9 against 40.8 percent).
The Empirical Methodology: the VAR Approach
The previous section highlights a signi…cant e¤ect of political uncertainty on the European credit market, but does not allow for catching a possible reverse relationship or e¤ect. Indeed, it can be the case that it is the market to put pressure on governments, making them unable to implement some contingent measures rather than other ones. The latter case may be partially due to a view, commonly held by policy makers, according to which, …nancial speculators, through their huge bearish bets, have prevented the governments from setting adequate measures, worsening the crisis. To this end, I employee a panel Vector Autoregressive approach which is highly recommended when the goal is to study a phenomenon without any strong prior about the causality's direction.
There are several empirical studies that have already used both a VAR approach and a vector error correction model (VECM) in analyzing CDS markets. This is concerned with that part of the literature which has been dealing with understanding better whether the CDS market is more e¢ cient than the underlying sovereign bond market. Arce at al. When dealing with VAR, the …rst step is to determine whether the VAR is performed in levels or …rst di¤erences, and, whether any long-run relationship exists between the credit risk measures and the policyrelated uncertainty index, by exploring their own time-series characteristics. On one hand, I can argue several reasons in favor of the stationarity of the CRP measures. First of all, given the short available sample, the non-stationarity can emerge as a small sample property, which cannot be avoided since the dataset contains also advanced economies for which no CDS contracts were traded before the mid-2007 …nancial crisis. In addition, the model I calibrated is based on the assumption of a mean-reverting process, which is stationary by construction. On the other hand, since I am going to use a VAR model, it is good and common practice to study the characteristics of time-series in detail to check if they are cointegrated. Indeed, as we know, the presence of cointegration leads to a di¤erent VAR representation: i.e., the VECM model. Therefore, When dealing with IRFs, the main issue is to chose the best Cholesky ordering, namely, the order of the variables in the model because the …rst variable respond contemporaneously to the shock, whereas the second one react with a lag. In other words, there is a hierarchy in the way shocks hit the variables. Moreover, these functions require that a shock occurs only in one variable at a time, thus, a reasonable assumption is to have independent shocks. This is reached by orthogonalizing the covariance matrix of the residuals by using the Choleski decomposition. Therefore, I put political uncertainty …rst since my goal is to study the evolution and propagation of political shocks to the credit market. Figure 3 plots the IRFs for both systems as reported by Table 8 . The top-left graph of Figure 3 shows how a political shock of ten standard deviations increases the European credit risk premium of 1 percent and takes two months before disappearing. Additionally, a political shock has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect also on the default risk that reaches a peak after one month, for then decreasing and disappearing on the second month as shown by the top-right graph. Such a picture highlights a scenario where investors ask a premium when political shocks hits the European credit market with this e¤ect being larger on the risk premia. The bottom-left graphs does not show any signi…cant reverse response of political uncertainty to a credit risk premium shock. The bottom-right plot depicts an interesting and surprising scenario, that is, a shock to the credit market that increases the default risk in Europe leads to a signi…cant decrease in the degree of political uncertainty after three months the shock is generated. This may signal the corrective or disciplinary role of the market in putting pressure on policymakers to act so as to reduce political uncertainty in the presence of a serious risk of default rather than "mere" variations in the risk aversion.
Exploring the Heterogeneity in the Credit Market
The cluster analysis in Section 1.1 shows that the European credit market masks speci…c credit risk features that can be clustered. In this section I investigate the relation between political uncertainty and the credit market on a country level. Thus, a bivariate VAR approach is employed since I believe that the Granger causality may be reverted for some countries. Indeed, it can happen that problems in the credit market of a country increase the degree of political uncertainty. The econometric model is the following
where Y i;t is either [P olIdx t ; CRP t ] or [P olIdx t ; DRP t ], i captures country-speci…c …xed e¤ect and X i;t is the set of control variables that includes the local stock market, the VIX Index, the iTraxx Euro CDX, the price-to-earning ratio of the Dax Index, the TED spread and the gold price. All the controls are in log-di¤erences. Tables 9a and 9b report the estimation output for the system political uncertainty/credit risk premium.
As expected, there is a sort of heterogeneity with which the credit risk premia react to variations in the degree of political uncertainty. In the majority of cases there is a signi…cant and positive lead-lag relation between political uncertainty and the credit risk premia. Interestingly, the state of the local economy is negatively related to the premia in Europe, whereas the Eastern economies'credit risk premia are positively related to the uncertainty in the US …nancial market as shown by the VIX coe¢ cients. Such a result still support, once again, the view that these economies have been relying heavily on foreign borrowing, thus, very exposed to spillover e¤ect. Moreover, the core and peripheral economies'premia are signi…cantly linked to the performance of the German industrial sector, as the price-to-earnings ratio shows a clear relation. Finally, all these variables explain, on average, almost the 56 percent of the variability in the credit risk premia throughout Europe. Additionally, Table 9b depicts a scenario of a reverse causality for few countries that have been experiencing serious debt issues such as Italy, Ireland, Spain and UK, where higher domestic distress risk a¤ects signi…cantly the degree of political uncertainty in Europe. Interestingly, political uncertainty is strongly and positively associated to spillover from the US …nancial market.
Slightly di¤erent are the scenarios concerning the default risk. Table 10a and 10b report the results.
There exists a signi…cant lead-lag e¤ect for fewer countries'default risk than the credit risk premia. days. The electoral debates were actually focused on state reforms, to which the topics of public debt, de…cit cuts and socio-economic reforms were added after the …rst Greek bailout. Similar worries were in play for the Italian and Spanish governments, which did no more than increase political instability in the Euro zone.
Interesting is the reverse lead-lag e¤ect of the default risk on the degree of political uncertainty. For more than half of the countries in the sample, higher default risk leads to an increase in the political uncertainty after two or three months. Comparing Tables 9b and 10b , there emerges that the one-month lead-lag relation with political uncertainty is negative, even if not signi…cant at all, for almost all the countries. Such a scenario may con…rm the corrective role of the market already highlighted on the aggregate level by the panel IRFs.
The whole picture that emerges shows how investors react heterogeneously to variations in the political uncertainty and how the latter may be signi…cantly increased by investors' expectations on the countryspeci…c default risk.
To further explore the heterogeneity, I follow Longsta¤ et al. . Such a scenario is interesting in the sense that political uncertainty that is generated mostly by the core economies a¤ects signi…cantly the other two macro regions, but then, higher risk premia in these regions are associated with higher and signi…cant risk premia in the core economies as highlighted by the variables CRP IRFs depict a scenario where a political shock has a signi…cant impact on the risk premia of the peripheral economies after a month the shock is generated, and on the default risk of the core economies after three months, whereas a shock to the premia of the core economies leads to an signi…cant increase in the degree of political uncertainty after two months. Interestingly, as already shown by Table 12 , a shock to the credit market of the peripheral economies that increases their default risk brings about a decrease in the political uncertainty after a month. Such a result still con…rm the above mentioned view that it may be a signal of the disciplinary or corrective role of the market, that is, a distress hitting highly indebted countries forces policymakers to act accordingly decreasing de facto the political uncertainty. In other words, policymakers react to signals sent by the market which moves according to the contingent economic and political situation.
Conclusions
In this work, I stress the role of political uncertainty in the European credit market.
I decompose the CDS spread into the sum of two components, namely, the credit risk premium or distress risk and the default risk or jump-to-default risk. The former catches the compensation investors demand for bearing the risk due to unexpected variations in the default intensity, whereas the jump-to-default risk captures the sudden (negative) jump in the underlying bond value in case of default. The results show a signi…cant in ‡uence of political uncertainty on the sovereign credit risk. In particular, a 10%-increase in the degree of political uncertainty brings about a signi…cant and positive variation in both the credit risk premia and the default risk of about 3 percent. Such a result is robust to controlling for information already embedded in the European and US stock and credit markets. Moreover, the control variables play an additional role in purifying the political uncertainty index from economic and …nancial information, leaving out only the political part.
A panel Vector Autoregressive approach and then the impulse response functions highlight an interesting result, that is, a shock to the credit market that increases the default risk in Europe leads to a signi…cant decrease in the degree of political uncertainty after three months the shock is generated. This may signal the corrective or disciplinary role of the market in putting pressure on policymakers to act so as to reduce political uncertainty in the presence of a serious risk of default rather than "mere" variations in the risk aversion. Further analysis on an country-individual and regional levels show how such a corrective role of the market exists in the presence of a shock to the credit market of the peripheral economies, which are the most worrying ones, given their high level of indebtness.
The global picture that emerges from this work enables me to conclude that, on one hand, political uncertainty can be deemed as one the main driving factor of the European credit market, that contribute signi…cantly to increase the investors'risk aversion, but, on the other hand, policymakers react accordingly to turmoils in the credit market when there exists a serious risk of default, rather than simple variations in the credit risk premia.
This work relies on a particular proxy for political uncertainty which has allowed me to study the phenomena on a time series basis, instead of a simple event study analysis. To my best knowledge, currently, there is no alternative way to proxy for variations in political uncertainty over time and on a monthly frequency.
Therefore, future research may improve the results of this work and make them more robust by estimating the model on new and di¤erent time-series proxies for political uncertainty. Table 2 : Cluster Analysis'outcome applied on the correlation matrix of daily changes of 5-year CDS spreads over the full sample (Panel A) and two sub samples (Panel B and C). The method (Complete) and the distance (Euclidean) are selected to the extent that the cophenetic correlation (coph corr) is the highest. Table 3 : Principal Component Analysis performed on the correlation matrix of monthly log-changes of 5-year CDS spread for the whole set of countries (Europe19) and for Core (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK), Peripheral (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) and Eastern Economies (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania) over the period December 3, 2007 to January 22, 2013. The subtable in the bottom reports the univariate regressions (with a constant) of the …rst-di¤erences of the …rst PCs for each cluster on the Policy-related uncertainty index (PolIndex), the MSCI Global Equity Index (MSCI), the Eurostoxx50 implied volatility (V2X), the iTraxx Euro CDX (iTraxx), the PE ratio of the Dax Index (PE), the VIX, the IG CDX, the TED spread and the Gold price . First PCs are in …rst di¤erences wheras the variables are in log-di¤erences. t-Stats in brackets. Level of signi…cance: 1***, 5** and 10* per cent. Table 6 : Credit Risk Premium: Panel regressions of CRP on the policy-related uncertainty index (PolIdx), the domestic stock markets (Stock), the Eurostoxx50 and S&P500 implied volatility (V2X and VIX), the iTraxx Euro CDX and IG US CDX (iTraxx and IGCDX), the price-earning ratio of Eurostoxx50 and Dax Indices (PE dax and PE Euro50 ), the MSCI Global Equity Index (MSCI), the TED spread (TED) and the gold price (Gold). Tha variables are in log-di¤erences. Country …xed e¤ect included. Monthly sample period December 3, 2007 to January 22, 2013. t-Stats in brackets, and errors clustered across time. Level of signi…cance: 1***, 5** and 10* per cent.
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(1) Table 12 : Vector Autoregressive approach on region level: bivariate VAR(3) with Default Risk and Political uncertainty. Variables: the policy-related uncertainty index (PolIdx), the domestic stock markets (Stock), the Eurostoxx50 and S&P500 implied volatility (V2X and VIX), the iTraxx Euro CDX and IG US CDX (iTraxx and IGCDX), the price-earning ratio of Eurostoxx50 and Dax Indices (PE dax and PE Euro50 ), the MSCI Global Equity Index (MSCI), the TED spread (TED) and the gold price (Gold). The variables are in log-di¤erences. Core Economies are Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and UK; Peripheral Economies are Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain; Eastern Economies are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Monthly sample period December 3, 2007 to January 22, 2013. t-Stats are not reported and robust standard errors. Level of signi…cance: 1***, 5** and 10* per cent.
